Within the framework of discrete probabilistic uncertain reasoning a large literature exists justifying the maximum entropy inference process, ME, as being optimal in the context of a single agent whose subjective probabilistic knowledge base is consistent. In [9] Paris and Vencovská, extending the work of Johnson and Shore [6] , completely characterised the ME inference process by an attractive set of axioms which an inference process should satisfy, thus providing a quite different justification for ME from that of the more traditional possible worlds or information theoretic arguments whose origins go back to nineteenth century statistical mechanics as in [8] or [5] .
Motivation
In this paper we consider the following fundamental problem of discrete multiagent probabilistic uncertain reasoning. We are interested in finding a general procedure which, given a finite set of agents, each possessing a subjective probabilistic knowledge base over a finite space of possible events, yields a single probability function or social probability function defined over that space of events, which optimally represents the joint knowledge of all the agents, and such that that general procedure satisfies some natural criteria derived from logical or rational considerations. There are several initial assumptions we want to make. Firstly we assume that the probabilistic knowledge of each particular expert is consistent with the laws of probability. Secondly all agents are assumed to have equal status, and the final social probability function should not depend on the order in which the agents' knowledge bases are considered.
We illustrate the motivation behind this idea by a toy two-agent example.
Imagine that two safety experts are dealing with a fault in a chemical factory producing nitrogen fertilizers. There is a problem with ammonia supply. Ammonia is stored in a tank connected to the rest of the factory by a valve which is operated by an electric circuit.
The first expert believes that there is a 40% chance of a mechanical fault on the valve. The second expert comes up with a different opinion that there is a 80% chance that there is a mechanical problem on that valve. Moreover, the first safety expert thinks that there is a 70% chance that there is a malfunction of the electric circuit. We suppose that both experts have no other knowledge related to this problem.
The joint beliefs (knowledge) of the two experts are inconsistent in this case. In practice, knowledge is usually incomplete and offers a lot of uncertainty; the first expert in above example has no knowledge about, for instance, the conditional probability that there is a fault on the the valve given that there is a fault on the electric circuit. The situation becomes more complicated once the second agent is considered whose knowledge is inconsistent with the knowledge of the first agent. Altogether we can ask the following question:
Question. How should a rational adjudicator whose only knowledge consists of what is related to him by the two experts above, evaluate the probability that both the valve and the electric circuit are faulty, based only on the experts' subjective knowledge specified above and without any other assumptions?
Assuming, as we do in this paper, that each agent's uncertain knowledge can be represented within the framework of probability theory, we can describe the knowledge of each expert by a set of possible probability distributions over four possible mutually exclusive cases: (1) a fault on the valve and no fault on the electric circuit, (2) a fault on the valve and a fault on the electric circuit, (3) no fault on valve and a fault on the electric circuit and (4) no faults on the valve or on the electric circuit (i.e. in this case there is a problem with something else). We can denote the corresponding probabilities that (1), (2) , (3) and (4) is true by real numbers w 1 , w 2 , w 3 and w 4 from the interval [0, 1] which sum to 1. Based on the knowledge of the first expert w 1 + w 2 = 0.4 and w 1 + w 3 = 0.7. Any probability function (x, 0.4−x, 0.7−x, x−0.1), where x ∈ [0.1, 0.4], is consistent with the knowledge of the first expert. Similarly, the second expert admits any (x, 0.8 − x, y, 0.2 − y) where x ∈ [0, 0.8] and y ∈ [0, 0.2]. This representation of the knowledge of the experts naturally abstracts from the complex nature of the actual problem. However we are not interested here in the particular manner in which this abstraction from the infinite complexity of a real world problem has been accomplished. Instead we will focus on the following narrower, abstract, but more clearly defined question:
Question. Given two (or more) sets of probability functions corresponding to the knowledge bases of corresponding experts as in the above example, which single probability function best represents the combined probabilistic knowledge of the experts? Naturally, we would like to find a general procedure doing this for any knowledge bases which satisfies some natural principles. We will formalize this idea in a general setting in the next section.
Formalization
Let L = {a 1 . . . a h } be a finite propositional language where a 1 , . . . , a h are propositional variables. In our example n = 2, a 1 stands for sentence "a fault on the valve" and a 2 stands for sentence "a fault on the electric circuit". By the disjunctive normal form theorem any L-sentence can by expressed as a disjunction of atomic sentences (atoms) and we will denote a maximal set of logically inequivalent atoms {α 1 , . . . , α J }, where J = 2 h , by At(L). The atoms of At(L) are thus mutually exclusive and exhaustive. A probability function w over L is defined by a function w : At(L) → [0, 1] such that J j=1 w(α j ) = 1. A value of w on any L-sentence ϕ may then be defined by setting
We will denote the set of all probability functions over L by D L . For the sake of simplicity we will often write w j instead of w(α j ), but note this has a sense only for atomic sentences. Given a probability function w ∈ D L , a conditional probability is defined by Bayes's formula
for any L-sentence ϕ and any L-sentence ψ such that w(ψ) = 0 and is left undefined otherwise. Now consider two distinct propositional languages L 1 = {a 1 , . . . , a h1 } and
Then every atom of the joint language L 1 ∪ L 2 can be written uniquely (up to logical equivalence) as α j ∧ β i for precisely one 1 ≤ j ≤ J and precisely one 1 ≤ i ≤ I. With only a slight abuse of notation, for an L 1 ∪ L 2 -probability function r we will often write r ji instead of r(α j ∧ β i ), in a similar way as for an L 1 -probability function v we write v j instead of v(α j ). Now notice that |= α j ↔ I i=1 α j ∧ β i . Therefore, the marginal probability function whose j-th value is given by I i=1 r ji is the projection of an L 1 ∪ L 2 -probability function r to the language L 1 . We will denote it by r| L1 . Similarly if ∆ is a set of L 1 ∪ L 2 -probability functions, we denote the set
A (probabilistic) knowledge base K over L is a set of constraints on probability functions over L such that the set of all probability functions satisfying the constraints in K forms a nonempty closed convex subset V K of D L . V K may be thought of as the set of possible probability functions of a particular agent which are consistent with her subjective probabilistic knowledge base K. In the sequel we shall loosely identify K with V K , and may also refer to such a V K as a knowledge base. Note that the non-emptiness of V K corresponds to the assumption that K is consistent, while if K and F are knowledge bases then the knowledge base K∪F corresponds to V K∪F = V K ∩V F . The set of all knowledge bases V K over L is denoted by CL.
In the toy example, the knowledge of the first expert can be represented by the knowledge base K which consist of a set of linear constraints on a probability function w = (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ) defined over the atomic sentences a 1 ∧a 2 , a 1 ∧¬a 2 , ¬a 1 ∧ a 2 and ¬a 1 ∧ ¬a 2 . Then K = {w 1 + w 2 = 0.4, w 1 + w 3 = 0.7} and
Given K ∈ CL 1 note that the underlying language L 1 is implicitly understood in the notation V K which should more properly be denoted
For simplicity we shall normally just write V K when the appropriate language is understood.
We now define the central notion which maps any given sequence of knowledge bases to a single probability function termed the social probability function for that sequence. A social inference process S defines for each L and n ≥ 1 a function
The number n here intuitively represents the number of distinct agents or distinct sources of information. The restricted notion S (or S L ) in the case of a single knowledge base or agent, i.e. when n = 1, is simply called an inference process and such inference processes have been extensively studied by Paris, Vencovská and others ( [6] , [8] , [9] , [5] or [4] ).
As was noted above, a consistent knowledge base K yields a set of possible probability functions V K consistent with K. In the case of single agent with knowledge base K there are several possible procedures to choose a specific probability function from V K . However by the traditional possible worlds modeling or information theoretic arguments whose origins go back to nineteenth century statistical mechanics as in [8] or [5] , the maximum entropy inference process ME has been justified as being optimal, where ME L (K) is defined as that unique probability function w in V K which maximizes the Shannon entropy E(w) of w given by
E is a strictly concave function and therefore it attains a unique maximum over any nonempty closed convex region V K of D L . A quite different justification for ME to the traditional ones was described in [6] by Johnson and Shore. Their work was developed by Paris and Vencovská in [9] where they showed that a list of principles based on symmetry and consistency uniquely characterises ME. It seems fruitful to look at the axiomatic approach also in the more general context of a social inference process. Accordingly we may ask:
What general principles should a social inference process S satisfy in order to ensure that for given knowledge bases, and in the absence of any other information, S chooses a social probability function according to rational criteria?
We might hope that ultimately such a set of rational principles may determine uniquely a particular social inference process S.
Language Invariance and Irrelevant Information
In this section we examine how certain fundamental invariance principles formulated by Paris and Vencovská for an inference process (see [7] ) can be extended to the notion of a social inference process. An obvious question we need to ask regarding social inference processes is whether they depend on the choice of a particular propositional language L = {a 1 , . . . , a h }. For fixed S, L, ϕ ∈ SL and K 1 , . . . , K n ∈ CL consider S L (K 1 , . . . , K n )(ϕ). It would seem to be irrational to change this value if L is extended by a set of propositional variables {b 1 , . . . , b k }, all distinct from the variables of L, provided that we have not supplied any new knowledge. Following [7] we will formulate this as the following principle:
Following [7] we can also ask a different question. What will happen if alongside the new propositional variables, new knowledge concerning these variables is also provided which contains no reference to the old variables. Again, it would seem to be rational that the value of a social inference process on a sentence that is formulated in original language should not change. This leads us to
where L 1 and L 2 are disjoint propositional languages, and let K 1 , . . . , K n and F 1 , . . . , F n be knowledge bases formulated for the languages L 1 and L 2 respectively. Then for any
In the case when n = 1 this principle plays a crucial role in the characterisation of ME in [9] . Nevertheless, despite its intuitive plausibility this principle is in fact very hard to satisfy; indeed although ME satisfies this principle, almost all other commonly used (single agent) inference processes do not do so (see [7] and [4] for details).
IIP appears even harder for a social inference processes to satisfy. However, in this multi-agent case we might argue that this principle is just too strong. If knowledge provided by agents for the language L 2 is inconsistent then the addition of such new knowledge may provide us with more information on how strongly the agents disagree, which in turn may affect our evaluation of the knowledge concerning L 1 . However, if the new knowledge does not change the level of disagreement as is the case when the new knowledge of all the agents is jointly consistent, then the principle of irrelevant information is arguably more justified. Accordingly we formulate:
where L 1 and L 2 are disjoint propositional languages. Let K 1 , . . . , K n and F 1 , . . . , F n be knowledge bases formulated for the languages L 1 and L 2 respectively, and suppose that F 1 , . . . , F n are jointly consistent. Then for any
Assuming LI this last equation is equivalent to
For instance, in the toy example of section 1 the information of both experts about a fault on the electric circuit is both consistent and a priori irrelevant to the probability that there is a fault on the valve. Hence if we want to know only the probability that there is a fault on the valve, then applying the CIIP we need consider only the fact that the first expert states that this probability is 40% and the second states that this probability is 80%.
The Social Entropy Process
In this section we define a particular social inference process formulated by the second author in [10] and [11] . The Social Entropy Process SEP, is defined by the following two stage process. At the first stage we define the set ∆ L (K 1 , . . . , K n ) as those probability functions v which globally minimise the sum of Kullback-Leibler divergences (cross-entropies)
subject only to the conditions that w (1) ∈ V K1 , . . . , w (n) ∈ V Kn , where
Recall that v j and w (k) j stand for v(α j ) and w (i) (α j ) respectively, where α j is an atom and there are J (logically inequivalent) atoms in At(L).
It is not difficult to see (see [11] ) that ∆ L (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is nonempty if there is some atom α j such that for no i is it the case that for all w ∈ V Ki w(α j ) = 0. Under this condition ∆ L (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is well-defined. From now on we shall consider only n-tuples of knowledge bases K 1 , . . . , K n which satisfy this condition. Note that the definition of a social inference process is not much restricted by such an assumption.
In [11] it is proved that ∆ L (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is also a closed convex region of D L and therefore there is a unique probability function in ∆ L (K 1 , . . . , K n ) having maximal entropy, and we will denote this function by ME L (∆ L (K 1 , . . . , K n )). Therefore, at the second stage of the definition we set
It is clear that SEP L coincides with ME L in the case when n = 1 and, it is straightforward to show that SEP is language invariant. The set ∆ L (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is often a singleton and in that case the second stage is essentially redundant. For instance, this happens whenever V K k is a singleton for some k. The function which maps K 1 , . . . , K n to ∆ L (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is therefore called the weak social entropy process and is denoted by WSEP(K 1 , . . . , K n ).
. We will denote the set of all such n-tuples by Γ L (K 1 , . . . , K n ).
Lemma 4.1. The following are equivalent:
(i) The probability functions v, w (1) , . . . , w (n) minimize (1) subject only to
For a proof see [11] . We will define the maximal value of
The lemma above implies that SEP L coincides with the logarithmic (or "normalised geometric mean") pooling operator of decision theory (cf. [2] ) in the very special case when each V K k defines a single probability function.
In addition to the above pleasing properties, SEP satisfies a set of natural principles listed in [10] and [11] similar to those shown to be satisfied by ME in [9] . However these are almost certainly not sufficient to characterise SEP in the manner in which ME was characterised in [9] .
Furthermore, although SEP is language invariant, it does not satisfy the Irrelevant Information Principle IIP. A simple counterexample is provided by the following
There is only one L-probability function w (2) ∈ V K2∪F2 : (0, 0.4, 0, 0.6). Hence
which is maximal for x = 0.16.
Since IIP in its single agent variant played a crucial role in the characterisation of ME this failure could be interpreted as a significant criticism of SEP. However, while this principle may be too strong in the multi-agent case, note that the weaker CIIP principle may still be regarded as a natural generalization of the single agent IIP since it reduces to IIP for the case n = 1.
We
where L 1 and L 2 are disjoint propositional languages and K 1 , . . . , K n and F 1 , . . . , F n are knowledge bases formulated for the languages L 1 and L 2 respectively such that F 1 , . . . , F n are jointly consistent, then
We prove that WSEP satisfies CIIP in the following section. However except in the cases when ∆ L1 (K 1 , . . . , K n ) is a singleton the question whether SEP also satisfies CIIP remains open.
WSEP satisfies CIIP
In what follows we will fix two distinct propositional languages
For r ∈ SL, to simplify the notation we will often denote r| L1 (α j ) by r j· . We will also denote the conditional probability function r(β i |α j ) by r i|j . It follows that r ji = r j· r i|j , i.e. the value r ji can be computed as the product of the projection of r to L 1 on the L 1 -atom α j and the conditional probability r(β i |α j ).
Equality holds if and only if either there are real constants
1 , . . . , w
(1)
This lemma is Hölder's inequality, see [3] , and it will be very useful in the following proof.
In particular F 1 , . . . , F n could be empty in which case t can be arbitrary.
..,Kn∪Fn) . Let us consider probability functions
(a) Let t ∈ i V Fi . We are going to prove that
It is easy to see that
By lemma 5.1 this equality could only occur if for each j there are real constants l
ji = 0 holds for some k. Let us consider coefficient j to be fixed. If w (k) j· = 0 for every k let q ·|j be an arbitrary L 2 -probability function with value on i-th atom denoted as q i|j .
Otherwise fork such that w (k) j· = 0 let us define
Obviously,
and hence q ·|j is a well defined L 2 -probability function. Notice that thanks to proportionality the definition does not depend on the choice ofk:
In other words w
By (5) the projections to L 1 satisfy (w (1) | L1 , . . . , w (n) | L1 ) ∈ Γ L1 (K 1 , . . . , K n ).
Then for L 1 -probability function v defined by
we have that v ∈ ∆ L1 (K 1 , . . . , K n ). Moreover,
where r j· = i v j q i|j = v j and r i|j = rji rj· = vj q i|j rj· = q i|j which gives us the required result that r| L1 ∈ ∆ L1 (K 1 , . . . , K n ). This follows at once from lemma 5.2.
Theorem 5.4. SEP satisfies the CIIP in the special case when there is only one probability function in ∆ L1 (K 1 , . . . , K n ), say ∆ L1 (K 1 , . . . , K n ) = {w}. Note that by theorem 3.8 in [11] this holds whenever at least one of the agents has a knowledge base which fixes a probability function for L 1 .
Proof. By lemma 5.2 (b) clearly SEP L1∪L2 (K 1 ∪ F 1 , . . . , K n ∪ F n )| L1 = r| L1 = w = SEP L1 (K 1 , . . . , K n ).
Conclusion
In this paper we have sought to investigate the Irrelevant Information Principle in the context of multi-agent uncertain reasoning. While this principle plays a crucial role in an axiomatic characterization of ME given in [9] , we have argued that the most obvious generalization of the Irrelevant Information Principle to the multi-agent context may be too strong. We have proposed an alternative generalization called the Consistent Irrelevant Information Principle for a social inference process (CIIP). We have described the promising social inference
